In the current issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists -- the people responsible for the famous Doomsday Clock -- I have published a review of Jürgen Altmann's important new book, Military Nanotechnology: Potential Applications and Preventive Arms Control.
Here are a few excerpts from my review:
Deeply researched and carefully worded, Military Nanotechnology is an overview of an emerging technology that could trigger a new arms race and gravely threaten international security and stability. Jürgen Altmann's academic style allows the reader to assess nanotechnology's perilous military implications in plain, dispassionate terms. What we face might sound like science fiction, but, in this book, we have the facts laid bare, and they are hair-raising enough without embellishment. . .Altmann appropriately separates his assessments of nanotechnology's military implications into separate categories: those relating to current or conventional nanotechnology, and those concerning futuristic molecular nanotechnology (MNT). Although there is a continuum from today's nanotech work to near-future atomically precise manufacturing and eventually to nanoscale machinery making powerful products, the comparative impacts on society (and on the military) may not follow a smooth line. Altmann convincingly argues that the profound implications of MNT, while "necessarily general, speculative and incomplete," must be taken into account. Moreover, MNT's fundamentally new control of physical materials and manufacturing could lead to "qualitatively new means and methods of warfare" . . .
But beyond the weapons themselves, MNT's greatest impact on future warfare may come from low-cost, high-volume, exponential manufacturing of weapons systems and related infrastructure. Altmann speculates that if "the production facilities for raw material, feedstock, energy and final products as well as the transport systems are themselves produced by MNT, a very fast increase of the production and distribution of military goods is possible." Thus, he warns, "MNT production of nearly unlimited numbers of armaments at little cost would contradict the very idea of quantitative arms control," and would culminate in a technological arms race beyond control.
Given how much may be at stake, Altmann says it "is remarkable that the mainstream science community has practically ignored MNT and related ideas." By bringing scholarly attention to MNT, Altmann provides a valuable service. But while that effort is sure to encounter opposition from business and academic interests who prefer to discount such apocalyptic scenarios (in hopes of limiting public fears and preserving their funding streams), it is not actually the most contentious one he makes.
The book's most controversial thesis is not that MNT is plausible and should be taken seriously; it is that the only coherent response to this technology's military implications is to develop global governance structures that supersede existing national powers. . .
You can download the full review here as a PDF, or look for November/December issue of the magazine at your local bookstore or library.
Tags: nanotechnology nanotech nano science technology ethics weblog blog
"Military Nanotechnology" is the best book on nanotechnology policy that I'm aware of. His concrete recommendations are very helpful.
Posted by: Michael Anissimov | November 09, 2007 at 04:41 AM
Some consideration should be given to
1. what are the non-nano ways that production could greatly increase ?
Breakthroughs that allow expanded reel to reel production. ECD Ovonics quantum control devices made from polymers able to produced without or with limited performance degradation relative to silicon. Allowing for MEMS and computers to be produced far more quickly. MEMS can be used to create UAVs.
Breakthroughs with arrays of MEMS/NEMS to speed up 3D printing from the nanoscale up.
Mere force multiplier effects or the enabling of a more antiseptic war does not really alter the geopolitical situation.
Also, there is no motivations for global governance if it is primarily the existing major powers that get more and maintain a lead and dominance over others.
I think the existing national powers and the existing political structure could adapt to the most common and likely scenarios without ceding sovereignty.
2. How important is production relative to strategy and tactics or radically new systems capabilities ?
More clever usage of relatively mundane conventional weapons and non-weapons technology could be used to far greater effect. Air superiority and ruthlessness (similar to the Romans over Carthage or using the WW2 russian tactics of scorched earth but on enemy terrain) could be used to genocide a country in weeks.
Merely the production of a lot more robotic weapons does not overcome nuclear deterrent.
Posted by: Brian Wang | November 09, 2007 at 01:51 PM
Brian Wang - How does nano -enabled or -leveraging warfare count as a "more antiseptic" form of warfare? I would expect a messier variant, not a cleaner one, from most any form of nanoscale system you care to postulate. Even a nanoblock device could be a really nasty supply device and evidence hider for an insurgency, for instance.
-John
Posted by: John B | November 12, 2007 at 07:34 AM
*grin* No wonder you like it, Mike - it reinforces your position!
*shrug* Can't say I like your chosen endstate, but I can certainly understand your motivations. This nanotechnology "stuff" is certainly scary, were it to come even partway true.
-John
Posted by: John B | November 12, 2007 at 08:07 AM
The more antiseptic version of warfare would be for say the USA to get a lot more robotic vehicles (currently they have about 3000-4000). If the USA were to get up to 1 million+ because of advances in production then the robotic vehicles could perform more of the work of the soldiers and personnel. It would be more antiseptic (lower casualties) for one side.
If the robotic vehicles have high endurance (low energy usage) and are able to stay on constant watch then they could enable constant policing. Gigapixel images from low energy cameras, other types of spectrum scanners (lidar etc...). It would be a range of vehicles for different functions.
Posted by: Brian Wang | November 12, 2007 at 08:45 AM
While I agree that one side could potentially have lower casualties, that's assuming a stand-up fight with clearly defined opposition - which isn't the case in the current crop of low-intensity conflicts.
Collateral damage is also not addressed - something I think would need very careful handling, given the current 'training' in virtual combat. "If it's breakable, shoot it" is a basic mantra in most modern first-person shooter (FPS) game titles - at least, in all the ones I'm aware of.
And assuming fully-automated systems, there'll likely be a long and messy period of time during which the systems mature. Even after that period, opponents will likely be attempting to use the onboard programming of the systems against their creators, either literally (generating 'friendly fire' incidents) or figuratively (generating massive negative publicity with apparently unwarrented slaughter, or at least PR indicating such)
Given the FCS concept in the US army today, I agree that there will certainly be different vehicles for different tasks near-term, and I agree that optimization for specific roles will likely continue.
In short - I don't expect 'antiseptic' to even remotely apply to conflict in anything near term, and will be greatly surprised if the current asymmetric warfare model doesn't get worse, not better, over time and improved technology.
-John B
Posted by: John B | November 16, 2007 at 10:03 AM
The antiseptic from one side point of view in its more advanced form can handle asymmetric warfare. The permanent monitoring systems will basically put the populace into a robotic open prison. There would not be that much fighting because it would be clamped down. Constant analysis and visual tracking.
Plus there would still be human control behind the automation to prevent and limit hacking. There would still be the need for counter-cyber operations.
Posted by: Brian Wang | November 16, 2007 at 04:30 PM