The concept of sousveillance -- surveillance by the people, bidirectional surveillance, watching the watchers -- has been proposed by several people, including David Brin and Philippe Van Nedervelde (both members of CRN's Global Task Force).
But what could convince people, especially powerful people, to accept this level of openness?
In some cases, favorable public opinion might do the trick. For example, a food packaging company or a restaurant might install webcams throughout the workspace and then publicize the fact, using it to claim that they are demonstrably more hygienic than their competition that "doesn't dare to show how they work."
What about the military, the police, and other enforcers? That is a harder sell, because security organizations are traditionally closed and often secretive. But in these modern times, nearly every powerful force must be at least a little bit concerned about public opinion.
Which is better: to carefully control the flow of information, trying to minimize the presence of unauthorized cameras... or to allow cameras, both official and unofficial, and publicize the fact? Imagine the effect of webcamming a prison, showing exactly what is happening all the time and why. Those few guards who enjoy gratuitous cruelty would quickly be found out and dealt with, and meanwhile the justified actions of other guards in responding to aggressive prisoners would be witnessed.
To take the idea further, think about the impact of putting a webcam on every soldier fighting in an armed conflict. People all over the world would be able to see what those soldiers were shooting at and why -- and would have a much better sense of "the fog of war" in which the combatants struggle to make good decisions. Anyone actually targeting civilians would be quickly identified. (Perhaps sensitive information could be delayed -- for most tactical situations, this likely would amount to only a few hours, or days at the most -- and the shorter delay, the less time for enemy propaganda to take root.)
This is a radical proposal -- to let everyone everywhere watch your prison guards at work, or your army killing and capturing people. But if the effect is to limit the damage caused by the inevitable "few bad apples," it might be seen as a net positive.
Chris Phoenix and Mike Treder
Tags: nanotechnology nanotech nano science technology ethics weblog blog
I'll keep piping up against the idea of sousveillance at every opportunity, because I hate it.
A minor concern is that it is never presented in tandem with rewritting society's laws. For example in the USA there are 2 million people in prison for (bogus) narcotics offenses; most of them Black and Hispanic. With sousveillence enforced that number will grow an order of magnitude. Under present laws in the US I would expect to see over 1/4 of the population imprisoned and participating in forced prison labour. In a country such as China under sousveillence, I would expect her leaders to actively change the laws to imprison 100% of her population and subject them to forced labour. This still isn't my main concern with the idea of sousveillence...
My main concern is that sousveillence is a recipe for tyranny. It is almost inevitable. For example, all US fighter jet pilots (and many other pilots) consume amphetamines called "Go Pills" to stay awake, alert, and to improve reflexes. Possession is punishable in the US by a multi-decade prison term. So you either have sousveillence and a compromised air-force, or the sousveillence gets hacked.
The main tyranny threat occurs from classified government program employees. How does sousveillence deal with classified data? It can't!! This is why sousveillence fails miserably: employees working under classified agendas classified won't be under surveillence, and they will become tyrants. By nature of their occupation they are predisposed to tyranny. Do you really think the US will allow Russia and China to know when her missile silos will be going offline for computer upgrade? Really think having terror cells knowing the whereabouts of Police Officers at all times is a good thing? Really think allowing North Korea access to all of the world's weapons engineering knowledge is a good thing?! It doesn't matter whether you *watch* them build ICBMs. Merely *watching* the watchers doesn't effect any justice (can't take the ICBMs without sacrificing Soeul).
Sousveillence empowers tyrants and gives weaponry blueprints to terrorists. I know people will say sousveillence will happen anyway. But the key caveat is, am I allowed to destroy human-surveillence devices on my property without being arrested? It isn't good if the world knows what US military aerospace engineers are up to, or the exact location of every police officer for any given city.
Posted by: Phillip Huggan | August 14, 2006 at 11:39 AM
The issue of police or soldiers videotaping their activities is really not "sousveillance" as I understand it - that activity involves ordinary people doing the taping. However it is a growing trend, at least for the case of police. We have all seen the many video sequences of traffic stops and arrests on shows like Cops. And a new trend is arising, of taped interrogations. Last week an op ed in the Los Angeles Times reported on a pending bill in the California legislature to require all felony interrogations to be taped:
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-sullivan7aug07,0,7494266.story?coll=la-opinion-rightrail
"SB 171 would mandate electronic recording of all custodial interrogations of suspects in a place of detention during investigations of homicides and violent felonies. Various kinds of recording devices would be used, both audio and video. Many California police and sheriff departments already record these interviews, and passage of this bill would establish consistency statewide.
"My associates and I have spoken with experienced detectives from more than 485 law enforcement agencies in 44 states, including many in California, who record custodial interviews in major criminal investigations. We have yet to speak with an officer who would return to non-recorded interviews. Recordings protect innocent suspects and shield officers from unfounded claims that suspects were not given the Miranda warnings (without which individuals in custody may not lawfully be questioned), that improper coercive tactics were used or that police misstated what occurred.
"Recordings create a permanent record that allows courts and juries to see and hear exactly what the police and the suspects said and did during closed-door police station interviews. They permit detectives to concentrate on suspects' stories without needing to take extensive notes; when later reviewed, they often disclose overlooked clues; and they are useful in teaching effective interview techniques to new detectives.
"If the police conduct is appropriate, recordings prevent civil litigation and potential judgments for alleged coerced confessions and wrongful convictions.
"Mandatory recording statutes have been enacted in Illinois, Maine, New Mexico, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia, and have been put in place throughout Alaska, Minnesota and New Jersey under orders of those states' highest courts. The law enforcement experience in all these states has been uniformly positive."
Again, this is not the same as the universal surveillance or sousveillance of all public activities - as Phillip Huggan notes, that could easily lead to an oppressive state. And of course there is no guarantee that the police won't turn off the cameras to use more, shall we say, efficient means to elicit confessions. But still I think this is a good trend and a part of life where more of Brin's transparency can be very helpful.
And if it turns out that society can't have both safe streets and law-abiding cops, well let's find it out now and rip away the shield of ignorance and naivety which shelters us from the truth.
Posted by: Hal | August 14, 2006 at 03:31 PM
The leading edge of an effective sousveillance is currently what is being developed for tracking celebrities. Politicians and business leaders who are celebrities are also tracked.
There is also a lot of information available electronically on politicians, military leaders etc.... Financial records, phone records, web traces etc...
Infrared cameras are going to become almost as cheap as regular cameras
Radar is becoming cheaper
Digital cameras will have tens of megapixels and probably gigapixels. more on gigapixel cameras and pictures here Even ten gigapixels photos are being done
With resolution that is 500 times what is common today, you can take a panoramic shot of a large area of a city and then still focus in on people. With infrared and radar you can see through walls. the power usage is dropping by 50 times and the batteries are improving. Computer memory continues to increase. Wireless and fiber bandwidth will increase greatly.
People can be very far away and take pictures of others people (ordinary or leaders). You go to a tall building or fly your own robot planes or robot blimps.
There is also a lot of currently available technology for remote listening and for electronic eavesdropping. The availability of improved versions of this technology will increase.
the technology is and will be here.
Are there more "good guys" than "bad guys"?
Once we all know so much about each other then will a pragmatic adjustment of common lesser offence laws occur ? I think it will. Just as the courts in the US allow "petty crimes" to often get lesser penalties than a strict reading of the law might indicate.
Posted by: Brian Wang | August 14, 2006 at 05:37 PM
Brian -
Yes, the technology will exist, and maybe even available to people. But it will be illegal to use it in certain ways, and people will self-regulate once they hear of a couple people getting tossed in jail for doing it.
Look how quickly and complacently people have accepted the ban on "liquids" on planes. And if they get interviewed on TV, they always say the same stupid thing: "Well, it's inconvenient, but consider the alternative..." as if those were the only two possible alternatives.
So when there's a ban on using cameras in any public place where there may be children present, to prevent a few perverts from using cameras to stalk kids, it'll be "inconvenient, but consider the alternative".
Posted by: Tom Craver | August 14, 2006 at 07:26 PM
The spying and recording of images and info happens now and will happen. It is just not always revealed because it is mainly revealed for a reason like monetary gain.
the information and images will be recorded and brought out when it is useful to do so.
All of the harddrives and memory sticks are not policed. Liquid on planes has limited access points where checkpoints can be set up. Open alcohol is banned in cars but that still happens. What percentage is stopped?
Massive surveillance could detect crimes like open alcohol but you could also send out the level of police intervention that exists on new years eve.
Self-regulation will happen at certain points where enforcement or deterrence is effective.
Posted by: Brian Wang | August 14, 2006 at 10:13 PM
Brian: "Open alcohol is banned in cars but that still happens. What percentage is stopped?"
Quite true - but because it is illegal and commonly considered wrong, maybe 2% of drivers might commonly drive with an open can of beer, maybe 10% would ever do so. People self-regulate, when they belief it is wrong as well as illegal.
We already have photo bans in certain public places, thanks to reaction to 9/11 - how much will it take to have that extended to all public places? And how many people, told they aren't allowed to take a picture of something like a bridge or dam "for security reasons", simply comply and "think of the alternative"?
Can a volunteer panoptican work, if only 2% take the legal risks of furtively running their own surveillance, despite the security risks the government tells us that causes? After all, the government will have cameras everywhere they're needed - we can trust them, can't we?
Posted by: Tom Craver | August 15, 2006 at 12:45 AM
Hal -
If 'ordinary people' can record information under the concept of sousveillance, do not the military, police, (perhaps hate groups, terrorists) and/or others count as part of 'ordinary people'? Why or why not? Why would such groups not be able to interconnect information about people, places & activities they find of interest - for instance, where antiabortionists could find a pro-abortion doctor at any given time, or (to flip the coin) where police could find a drug dealer/pedophile/whatever at any given time?
Additionally, is anyone out there aware of any situations where surveillance/sousveillance content is/was faked? Given modern graphics capabilities, I'd suspect that we'd be capable of fakes of sufficient complexity to be quite difficult to prove/disprove. What happens to the surveillance/sousveillance networks when that capability becomes even more widespread?
-JB
Posted by: John B | August 15, 2006 at 08:54 AM
Hal -
If 'ordinary people' can record information under the concept of sousveillance, do not the military, police, (perhaps hate groups, terrorists) and/or others count as part of 'ordinary people'? Why or why not? Why would such groups not be able to interconnect information about people, places & activities they find of interest - for instance, where antiabortionists could find a pro-abortion doctor at any given time, or (to flip the coin) where police could find a drug dealer/pedophile/whatever at any given time?
Additionally, is anyone out there aware of any situations where surveillance/sousveillance content is/was faked? Given modern graphics capabilities, I'd suspect that we'd be capable of fakes of sufficient complexity to be quite difficult to prove/disprove. What happens to the surveillance/sousveillance networks when that capability becomes even more widespread?
-JB
Posted by: John B | August 15, 2006 at 08:54 AM
Hal -
If 'ordinary people' can record information under the concept of sousveillance, do not the military, police, (perhaps hate groups, terrorists) and/or others count as part of 'ordinary people'? Why or why not? Why would such groups not be able to interconnect information about people, places & activities they find of interest - for instance, where antiabortionists could find a pro-abortion doctor at any given time, or (to flip the coin) where police could find a drug dealer/pedophile/whatever at any given time?
Additionally, is anyone out there aware of any situations where surveillance/sousveillance content is/was faked? Given modern graphics capabilities, I'd suspect that we'd be capable of fakes of sufficient complexity to be quite difficult to prove/disprove. What happens to the surveillance/sousveillance networks when that capability becomes even more widespread?
-JB
Posted by: John B | August 15, 2006 at 08:55 AM
Um. Sorry for the triple post. I don't quite know how I managed that... *sour grin*
-JB
Posted by: John B | August 15, 2006 at 08:56 AM
Tom: Can a volunteer panoptican work, if only 2% take the legal risks of furtively running their own surveillance, despite the security risks the government tells us that causes?
I think we are in some kind of alignment on the ballpark of the numbers of people who would participate in a volunteer panoptican. I think 2% works. 2% of say 200 million (don't count children and some others)
That is 4 million. Some of those would be less active. Maybe they just try to walk around with a camera handy. Maybe it is in there car.
56,000 reporters according to BLS in the USA
http://data.bls.gov/oep/servlet/oep.nioem.servlet.ActionServlet?Action=empior&MultipleSelect=000000&Sort=ws_emp_b&StartItem=0&Resort=No&ResortButton=No&Base=2004&Proj=2014&SingleSelect=2730220359&Type=Occupation&Number=10
14,000 pro photographers in one of the main associations.
How many active reporting bloggers? Drudge report, smoking gun like.
Would there be some monetary incentives?
Just general quality reporting and the occasional scoop could result in monetizable traffic. So less volunteerish and more multi-purpose with economic components.
Traffic helicopters
Sporting event blimps
weather monitoring
Real time internet mapping
tourists and entertainment
More common and affordable aerial surveys
12.5 cm aerial survey (commercially available. Higher resolutions from lower passes)
Plus everyone will just have video cameras in their cellphone and in their cars to help with backing up and checking side to side.
There are photo bans at gyms and locker rooms and yet those kinds of photos are still commonly available on the web. Plus how many shots are taken for personal use.
If the cameras are far better in 5-10 years effective surveillance could be cheaply done from outside of buildings.
Satellite image resolutions and restrictions
Imagery from the most recent intelligence satellites launched by the United States government, is believed to have a resolution of about 2 cm.
Other source on military satellites
List of current and planned satellite imaging systems and capabilities Details on the KH12
Posted by: Brian Wang | August 15, 2006 at 10:26 AM
I wrote a bit more about satellites and gigapixels on my site. You could identify faces from 50-100 meters away without telescopic lens with a gigapixel camera. Almost all of the faces in a football stadium.
High resolution cameras available now and a DIY scanner version
Posted by: Brian Wang | August 15, 2006 at 01:27 PM
Brian
Cameras will eventually be required by law to have built-in shut-offs to enforce "blank zones" - it's already being pushed by the movie companies to prevent taking video in theatres, and applying it to Homeland "Security" is an obvious next step. Maybe a tiny number will hack their cameras or build their own. They'll be called terrorists and/or pirates.
Yeah, we'll eventually get a panopticon - but it'll hierarchical. "Privacy" will mean that citizens can't peer into other citizen's homes or anywhere that the government doesn't want them recording. The local police will be able to see anywhere that isn't "secret" via a warrant. The FBI will get instantaneous electronic "warrants" to look anywhere that isn't "top secret". And so on up the line of secrecy and power.
Posted by: Tom Craver | August 15, 2006 at 05:32 PM
I agree there is and will be a hierarchy of capability. I just do not see the bottom of the ladder at zero.
I think the top end will have to put more effort into getting privacy. Having faith in blank zone cameras and legal rules will not work.
Metamaterial invisibility, laser temporary blinding of detected cameras, camoflage/misinformation/misdirection to let it be known where something top secret is.
Movie company / anti-piracy is highly ineffective. There are some leading edge things that if enforcement and deterrence become effective will indicate that panopticon will have trouble. Currently I do not see that being the case.
Posted by: Brian Wang | August 15, 2006 at 10:19 PM
There are efforts to use trusted computing techniques in cameras to enable authentication of content recorded by police cameras, both video and still. a signature on produced content would allow it to be produced in court in such a way that one would have the prove that not only was the data tampered with - but that the camera itself was tampered with. it's not perfect, but it's useful.
I think that enforcing anti-sousveillance is going to get about as difficult to enforce as copyright infringement is today - along with patent infringement by the time nanofactories come around. Hell, anti-nanofactory laws themselves will be difficult to enforce - possibly about as much as drug laws are today. Like marijauna, nanofactories can be "cultivated" to make more of it.
So the relevant question isn't so much whether the powers will accept it - but what can they do about it?
Posted by: Nato Welch | August 16, 2006 at 12:03 AM