Excellent article by Lawrence Lessig in the April 2004 issue of Wired magazine, called "Insanely Destructive Devices: trying to defend against self-replicating weapons of mass destruction". Lessig makes the logical point that "if we can't defend against an attack, perhaps the rational response is to reduce the incentives to attack."
That's along the lines of one of CRN's key proposals -- reduce the need for competing programs of molecular manufacturing development by making access to the basic technology available to all.
As we wrote in our paper, "Three Systems of Action":
Once nanofactories can be built, people will demand access to them. If legitimate access is not provided, some of the "have-nots" will obtain black market devices of comparable functionality. Such devices would presumably be uncontrolled, thwarting any attempt to regulate, tax, or charge royalties on products they produce. Since a small nanofactory can make a bigger one, and a large one can make thousands of duplicates, smuggling would be impossible to prevent.
To minimize the black market, it is in the interests of both Guardian and Commercial organizations to supply nanofactories, as capable and flexible as possible, to the entire global population. This flexibility must include the ability to build certain products with minimal royalties or taxes—preferably zero added cost, because anything else would only encourage illicit factories.
Of course, the factories cannot be completely unrestricted. Certain weapons, substances, and dangerous nanobots should be prohibited or restricted, and all commercial intellectual property should be controlled according to the wishes of the owner. However, aside from these limitations, Information system workers should be given free rein to design and give away any product. This will greatly reduce the pressure for illicit factories.